European Defence: Are We Finally Moving?
Good morning! We are David Carretta, Christian Spillmann and Oliver Grimm, and we are presenting you the Morning Post Europe. Parts of it are translated with the help of AI, but always edited by one of us.
Today’s story is devoted to the meeting of EU defence ministers. Christian asks whether they are capable of breaking out of the paralysis surrounding Europe’s defence ambitions.
In our briefing we cover yesterday’s Foreign Affairs Council: Kaja Kallas announced internal EU discussions to determine the bloc’s red lines for any future negotiations with Russia. Ministers also reached an agreement on sanctions against violent Israeli settlers in the West Bank. In Britain, Keir Starmer is betting on the EU to revive his political fortunes and halt Nigel Farage’s advance. The DMA is forcing Apple and Google to make life easier for Europeans switching smartphones. The Commission is preparing to release more free ETS allowances and reduce fines linked to methane emissions.
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European Defence: Are We Finally Moving?
By Christian Spillmann
Will Europeans go on procrastinating over their own defence for much longer? The idea of a European military capability dates back to 1999. Since then, little or nothing has moved. The wars in the former Yugoslavia, followed by the disaster in Afghanistan and the fall of Kabul, were each wake-up calls. Each was followed by political amnesia. Now the issue has returned with force, driven by Donald Trump’s repeated threats to withdraw American troops from Europe. Once again, Europe has entered a state of strategic panic.
A proposal has now been tabled by Andrius Kubilius, the European commissioner for defence: the creation of a permanent European military force of 100,000 troops, backed by an intergovernmental treaty integrating the capabilities of willing EU member states together with those of the UK, Norway and Ukraine. The objective would be clear: to allow Europeans to respond autonomously and credibly to a Russian attack without relying on the United States. Will the idea even be seriously discussed at the meeting of EU defence ministers on May 12? There is reason for scepticism. Kaja Kallas, the EU’s High Representative, remains firmly opposed to the creation of a European military force.
“Build a European Defence Union — and build it now.” The appeal, published on May 8 by around thirty MEPs from pro-European political families, captures the urgency of the moment. Whether it will lead to action is another matter entirely. The past three decades have been defined less by strategic ambition than by missed opportunities.
The wars in the former Yugoslavia deeply shocked Europeans. For the first time, at the Helsinki summit in 1999, EU leaders set themselves a concrete military objective: member states were to be capable, by 2003, of deploying and sustaining between 50,000 and 60,000 troops for at least one year. National commitments were formally presented at a capabilities conference in Brussels in November 2000. The project quietly failed.
The EU scaled down its ambitions in 2004 with the creation of “Battlegroups” — highly mobile tactical units of 1,500 soldiers. Operational by 2007, they were never deployed. Political paralysis and financing disputes killed the initiative before it could prove its worth.
Fourteen years later, in the summer of 2021, Europeans once again found themselves confronted with strategic reality. The withdrawal agreement negotiated by Donald Trump with the Taliban at the end of his first term forced Joe Biden to pull American forces out of Afghanistan. The collapse was immediate. Kabul fell. Europeans, incapable of securing the airport to continue evacuation operations, were forced to abandon thousands of Afghan allies. Shocked by the episode, Josep Borrell argued for a European force capable of intervening rapidly in emergencies.
In March 2022, shortly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU adopted its defence “Strategic Compass” and launched a Rapid Deployment Capacity of 5,000 European troops. The force is now operational. But it remains a first-entry capability — not a serious territorial defence force.
Trump’s return to the White House has revived tensions between the United States and its European allies. The American president operates with the instincts and methods of a small-time mob boss. Infuriated by criticism from German chancellor Friedrich Merz over his lack of strategy and what Merz described as the mistake of attacking Iran, Trump reportedly decided to withdraw 5,000 US troops from Germany as punishment for this perceived act of lèse-majesté.
The move concerns the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment, deployed to Germany by the Biden administration in 2022 in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and stationed in Vilseck, Bavaria. The brigade includes nearly 5,000 troops together with air-defence systems, artillery, drones, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.
The departure of this unit would be significant because of its capabilities. But its return to the United States is not yet definitive. It could instead be redeployed to another Alliance country. Many Europeans refuse to believe that Mr Trump will carry out his threats. “Europe still hesitates to admit that the ongoing transformation of the transatlantic partnership is irreversible. A lack of strategic vision is rarely productive and generally leads to misjudgments, if not outright irrelevance,” warns Pierre Vimont, former secretary-general of the European External Action Service, in a contribution for Carnegie Europe.
The American disengagement from Europe is no longer hypothetical. It is planned, announced and increasingly operationalised. More worrying still is the Trump administration’s growing willingness to question the foundations of NATO itself. In a widely discussed article published on May 7 in the NewYork Times, political scientist Claudia Major warned that there were now two possible paths ahead: one towards a gradual and co-operative rebalancing of responsibilities between Europe and the US; the other towards “chaos and hostility” and a permanently damaged alliance.
Between 70,000 and 80,000 American troops remain stationed across Europe, including roughly 36,000 in Germany alone. Earlier this year, Kubilius proposed the creation of a permanent European military force of 100,000 troops, explicitly designed to compensate in part for any future reduction of US forces on the continent. The scale of the proposal reflects a growing recognition that Europe must both deter Russia and prepare for strategic uncertainty in Washington.
The problem is institutional as much as political. The European Commission has no formal competence in defence matters, and Kubilius appears relatively isolated. Defence remains the sovereign domain of member states. Kallas has repeatedly opposed the creation of a separate European army, describing the idea as “extremely dangerous” because parallel structures risk diluting NATO’s responsibilities.
Instead, Kallas argues for strengthening the European pillar within the alliance. But how credible can such a pillar really be when Europe’s armed forces remain fragmented, underfunded and largely dependent on American systems? Most European armies remain ill-prepared for high-intensity warfare. Meanwhile, the continent is deprived of the only truly battle-hardened military force in Europe — Ukraine’s — because Washington refuses Kyiv’s NATO membership for fear of provoking the Kremlin. Kubilius’s proposal at least attempts to confront these contradictions directly.
As Claudia Major argues, “A Europeanised NATO will need to develop a specifically European model of deterrence and defence, one that reflects the continent’s political culture, geography and resources.” That, in turn, would require political leadership — perhaps through the informal E5 grouping of France, Germany, Italy, Poland and the UK, or through the emerging “coalition of the willing” formed in response to the war in Ukraine, in which the United States would play only a supporting role.
Europe has spent 25 years discussing strategic autonomy. The uncomfortable question now is whether it still has time to keep talking.
The Quote
“Gerhard Schröder has been high level lobbyist for Russian state-owned companies. So, it is clear why Putin wants him to be the person so that actually, he would be sitting on both sides of the table”.
EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Kaja Kallas.
Geopolitics
Kallas announces discussions on what to say to Russia — “Before we discuss with Russia, we should discuss amongst ourselves what we want to talk to them about,” the High Representative, Kaja Kallas, said yesterday, announcing a discussion at the Gymnich meeting in Cyprus on May 27th. The Gymnich is the informal gathering of foreign ministers held every six months. On that occasion, Ms Kallas wants to build a consensus on “what we want and what our red lines are”. The High Representative pointed to several “concessions” that should be obtained in any direct dialogue, extending beyond Ukraine to encompass Europe’s wider security architecture. “I was just last week in Moldova. There are Russian troops, for example, that could be also one of the conditions to have stability and security in the region, that they take their troops away. But there are, of course, a lot of questions related to what are our requests to Russia, in order to have a stable and peaceful Europe,” said Ms Kallas.
The High Representative nonetheless remains sceptical about Moscow’s genuine willingness to negotiate. “At the moment we do not see Russia negotiating in good faith,” she said.
A chorus of “no” to Putin’s proposal on Schröder — “If we give the right to Russia to appoint negotiator on our behalf, that would not be very wise,” said the High Representative, Kaja Kallas, yesterday, accusing former German chancellor Gerhard Schröder—suggested by Vladimir Putin—of being “a lobbyist” for Russia. “We absolutely do not support such a candidacy,” reacted Ukraine’s foreign minister, Andrii Sybiha, adding that there are many other deserving leaders in Europe who could fulfil such a role. “A mediator must be accepted by both parties, which appears to be lacking in this case. Former chancellor Schröder has not exactly demonstrated in the past all the qualities necessary to act as a neutral and impartial mediator. He has certainly allowed himself to be heavily influenced by Putin,” said Germany’s minister of state for Europe, Gunther Krichbaum.
Ukraine sees an opportunity to strengthen Europe’s role — With Donald Trump distracted by his war against Iran, Ukraine appears convinced that a window of opportunity has opened to give Europe greater weight in the ongoing negotiations with Russia. “We have a chance for Europe to play a special role in our peace efforts,” said foreign minister Andrii Sybiha. But from Europe “we need a one-voice approach”, he warned.
Putin’s growing domestic weakness could also work in the EU’s favour. “We were analysing also what do these messages by Putin mean. Because it is different than he has said before”, said Kaja Kallas. “I think the overall understanding is that Putin is in a weaker position than he has ever been before. We see that they are losing on the battlefield a lot of lives. There is growing discontent in the Russian society. That is why they are also turning off the internet that people could not access the actual news. That is why, also their deep strikes that Ukraine has made, have made really an impact. The support for Putin's war is going down.” According to Ms Kallas, all this shows that “actually really Putin is not standing that strong, but what we are not in the point where actually they would genuinely negotiate, because they are still presenting maximum claims.”
Opening all accession chapters with Ukraine by the summer — Following Viktor Orbán’s departure, the moment may have arrived to accelerate Ukraine’s accession process. “After the elections in Hungary, we may have a new dynamic in our efforts to become an EU member,” said Ukraine’s foreign minister, Andrii Sybiha, recalling that membership is a central element of Kyiv’s security guarantees in the event of a peace agreement. Kaja Kallas signalled a desire to “open all negotiating chapters by the summer”.
But which summer? The Ukrainian summer begins on June 1st. The European calendar points to June 21st. But for the EU, summer is a highly flexible concept. Ms Kallas explained that the Foreign Affairs Council had discussed what exactly “summer” means. For her, summer begins in a few weeks. But “apparently the European summer is August”, she added.
The Kremlin “kills” a European minister with Ukrainian drones – Latvia’s defense minister was dismissed for failing in his mission to protect the country’s airspace, which was breached by two Ukrainian drones diverted by the Russians and used to strike an empty fuel depot several dozen kilometers from the Russian border. Latvian Prime Minister Evika Siliņa used very harsh words. “Defense Minister Andris Sprūds has lost my confidence and that of society. I have decided to request his resignation. The defense sector must now be led by a professional.”
Sprūds will be replaced by a military officer, Colonel Raivis Melnis. “Society has entrusted the defense sector with historically unprecedented funding – nearly 5% of GDP. That is an immense responsibility requiring clear results,” the head of government explained. The turmoil caused by the incident — air raid alerts, school closures, and the mobilization of French aircraft from NATO’s Baltic mission — explains the Estonian leader’s outburst.
Italy’s defense minister came to his counterpart’s defense in rather blunt terms. “I am sorry that you had to resign at the request of your President because of a drone attack, as if it were your responsibility (...) Someone should have explained to her that we are facing technologies that now evolve every week, emerging directly on the battlefield, which is difficult even for those who, like you, devote 5% to defense,” wrote Guido Crosetto. For the Italian minister, Sprūds’ resignation is a victory for Russia and a loss for Latvia.
The Commission drags its feet on trade sanctions against West Bank settlements — EU foreign ministers yesterday reached an agreement awaited for more than a year on a proposal to sanction a handful of violent Israeli settlers in response to the deteriorating situation in the West Bank. The agreement, reached after Hungary dropped its veto, also unlocked a new sanctions package against Hamas. But the EU appears unable to go any further. Calls from France and Sweden for trade sanctions against Israeli settlements in the West Bank continue to go unanswered beacuse of a lack of willingness from the Commission.
Asked by journalists why the Commission had not tabled a proposal on trade sanctions, Kaja Kallas replied as follows: “It is logical that High Representative should also deal with trade, but it is not my portfolio. So, it is Commission's initiative, and every Commissioner has their portfolio. Immediately after the last Foreign Affairs Council, we also had the Commission. I raised this issue that Member States want this proposal. I asked this, but the proposal is not there, and I cannot draft it.”
Bettel’s blunt criticism of his European peers – “We are unable to take even the slightest action simply because some countries are timid.” Known for his outspoken style, Luxembourg’s foreign minister Xavier Bettel was visibly furious yesterday over the EU’s inability to sanction violence committed by Israeli settlers against Palestinians. “Some tell us that history means they are eternally indebted to Israel, but that excuses nothing. We cannot simply accept turning a blind eye.”
An agreement was reached at the end of the meeting of EU foreign ministers to impose individual sanctions on settlers and entities. The decision sparked anger from Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar: “Israel has always stood, stands, and will continue to stand for the right of Jews to settle in the heart of our homeland (...) The attempt to impose political opinions through sanctions is unacceptable and will not succeed.”
Post-Brexit
Starmer bets on the EU to revive his fortunes and challenge Farage — After Labour’s heavy defeat in last week’s local elections, Keir Starmer intends to bet on closer ties with the European Union to save his premiership. “At the next EU summit, I will set a new direction for Britain. The last government was defined by breaking our relationship with Europe. This Labour government will be defined by rebuilding our relationship with Europe, by putting Britain at the heart of Europe,” said Mr Starmer. The British prime minister promised a “a big leap forward” in relations with the EU on the economy, trade and defence. “Standing shoulder to shoulder with the countries that most share our interests, our values and our enemies, that is the right choice for Britain. That is the Labour choice.”
Mr Starmer appears convinced that rapprochement with Europe is the best way to halt the advance of Nigel Farage, the architect of Brexit, and his Reform party. Yesterday the prime minister recalled that Mr Farage had promised a stronger, richer country, more money for the NHS and fewer migrants, but “all of this turned out to be false”.
Starmer remains too timid for a real EU breakthrough — Those hoping for a clear shift from Keir Starmer on Britain’s return to the single market and customs union were disappointed. Asked by journalists about the possibility of abandoning the red lines in Labour’s election manifesto, the prime minister responded vaguely. “What I want to do is make a major step forward with this year’s UK-EU summit and bring us closer both economically and commercially, as well as on defence and security, and that will be the foundation on which we build our future,” said Mr Starmer. In any case, the prime minister did not go into details.
Mr Starmer merely announced that a new youth mobility programme would be “at the heart of the new agreement with the EU”. “That’s it? Is this a joke?” commented Mujtaba Rahman, Europe director at Eurasia Group, on X.
Digital sovereignty
Moving data from iPhone to Android will become easier thanks to the DMA — Apple and Google are preparing to take a historic step that will simplify life for European consumers in order to comply with the Digital Markets Act on portability. iPhone and Android users will soon benefit from new features on their devices, including a solution for transferring data between the two ecosystems. Users will be able easily to transfer data between iPhone and Android when setting up a new device, including contacts, messages, photos and third-party app data.
At the same time, app developers will find it easier to retain users switching from iPhone to Android devices and vice versa. The DMA requires designated platforms—including iOS and Android—to guarantee effective data portability. Apple and Google’s decision follows two years of discussions with the Commission.
The DMA also pushes Apple into concessions on interoperability — From June 1st, Apple will have to implement new interoperability solutions for third-party accessories in order to comply with the Digital Markets Act. Smartwatches competing with the Apple Watch will be able to display the full content of iPhone notifications and interact with them. Users will be able to pair non-Apple devices—watches, earphones and speakers—simply by bringing them close to the iPhone, as already happens with Apple products. Finally, third-party headphones will be able automatically to transfer a call from an iPhone to a laptop, just as Apple devices currently do.
Green deal
The Commission releases free ETS allowances for energy-intensive industry — Yesterday the Commission published its proposal to update the so-called ETS “benchmarks” for the 2026-30 period, with the aim of easing the burden of the emissions trading system on energy-intensive industries. Under the proposed benchmarks, industry will continue to receive, on average, free allowances covering around 75% of emissions.
In addition, to encourage industrial electrification, the updated approach maintains coverage of indirect emissions linked to electricity use across 14 product benchmarks. The estimated financial impact amounts to around €4bn for the 2026-30 period. A broader ETS revision is scheduled for July.
The Commission accused of making concessions to America on methane emissions — The European Commission is accused of yielding to pressure from the Trump administration as it prepares to revise methane-emissions rules, using the energy crisis triggered by the Gulf war as a pretext for scrapping fines on those failing to comply with limits.
“There is no need to make any changes to the EU methane regulation in order to preserve energy security: allowing other countries or LNG-exporting companies to blackmail the EU is a sign of weakness,” said Linda Kalcher, executive director of Strategic Perspectives. The Trump administration has exerted strong pressure on the EU to revise methane rules. According to Ms Kalcher, “giving in to pressure risks undermining Europe’s sovereignty and its ability to set global standards for emissions reductions”.
The Commission defends itself, while confirming plans to loosen methane rules — A Commission spokeswoman yesterday replied that the new recommendations on fines under the methane-emissions regulation would not be adopted “solely because of the United States”. But “at present we are operating in a highly uncertain and complex situation regarding energy markets, and we have said we are willing to assess implementation of the regulation within the flexibility it provides”, she added.
The proposal, which will be presented “shortly”, will be “in the interest of the industries we work with” and aimed at “avoiding insurmountable obstacles to trade”, said the spokeswoman. It is a confirmation that the fines due to apply from 2027 onwards could end up being very limited.
Today’s Agenda
Defence Council
Culture and Sport Council
Cypriot EU presidency: informal meeting of energy ministers in Nicosia
Cypriot EU presidency: informal housing meeting in Nicosia
Commission: President von der Leyen receives Séamus Boland, president of the European Economic and Social Committee
Commission: Vice-President Minzatu takes part in the High-Level Dialogue with Ukraine
Commission: Commissioner Kos in Slovakia meets prime minister Robert Fico
Commission: Commissioner Roswall in Namibia
Commission: Commissioner Hoekstra in Portugal
Commission: Commissioner McGrath in Greece meets prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis
Commission: Commissioner Zaharieva in Italy meets industry minister Adolfo Urso
European Parliament: President Metsola attends the Copenhagen Summit on the security of children and families in the AI era; receives the Conference of European Bishops
European Parliament: press conference on a single rail ticket
European Court of Justice: ruling on META’s appeal regarding online remuneration for press articles on its platform
NATO: Secretary-General Rutte in Montenegro meets president Jakov Milatović and prime minister Milojko Spajić
Eurostat: statistics on the Recovery and Resilience Facility in 2025; data on extra-EU trade in agricultural products in 2025; data on immigration and crime in 2025